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Aug. 1969] SOUTHERN CAL. ACOUSTICS CO. V. 719 
C. V. HOLDER, INC. 
[71 C.2d 719; 79 C:il.Rptr. 319, 456 P.2d 975] 
[L. A. No. 29607. In Bank. Aug. 5, 1969.] 
SOUTHEHN CAI.JIFORNIA ACOUSTICS CO., ·INC., Plain-
tiff and Appellant, v. C. V. HOLDER, INC., et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
[1] Contracts- Consent-Necessity for Acceptance. ~ Silence in 
the face of an offer is not an acceptance, unless there is a 
relationship between the parties or a previous course of 
dealing pursuant to which silence would be understood as 
acceptance. 
[2] Public Works-Subletting.-' In the absence of an agreement 
to the contrary, listing of a subcontractor in a prime bid on a 
public improvement project is not an implied acceptance of 
the subcontractor's bid by the general contractor, but is in 
response to statutory command (Gov. Code, § 4104) and cannot 
reasonably be construed as an expression of acceptance. 
[3] Estoppel-Equitable Estoppel-Promissory Estoppel.-. There 
must be a promise that· was relied on before the rule can be 
invoked that a promise which the promisor sh-ould reasonably 
expect to induce action or forebearance of a definite and 
substantial character on the part of the promisee and which 
does induce such aetion or forebearance is binding if. injustice 
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. 
[4] Public Works-Substitution .,and Subletting.-The pll1'J>9se of 
Gov. Code, § 4107, relating to substitution of subcontracto'ts:cby 
the prime contractor on a public improvement contract, is not ' 
limited to providing the awarding authority with an opportu-
nity to approve substitute contractors, but its purpose is also to 
protect the public and subcontract9rs from the evils attendant 
upon the practices of bid shopping ( use of a low bid already 
received to' pressure other subcontractors into SUbmitting 
lower bids) and bid peddling .(an attempt bysubcontrac'tor to 
[1] See ·Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 23; Am.Jur.2d, COntracts, § 47. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Public Works and Contracts, § 10. 
[3] Promissory estoppel, notes, 115 A.L.R. 152, 48 A.L.R.2d 
1069. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Estoppel, § 9; A~.Jur.2d, Estoppel 
and \Vaiver, §§ 48, 49 
W!IIcK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 20; [2, 4-9] Public 
orks, § 10; [3] Estoppel, § 24(7.5). 
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undercut kn.own bids already submitted to the general c.ontrac • 
. tor) subsequent to the award .of the prime contract f.or a 
public facility. 
[6] Id.-.Substitution and Subletting.-G.ov. C~de, § 4107, relating 
t.o substituti.on .of subcontractors by a prime contract.or .on a 
public improvement contract, limits the right .of the prime ' 
contract.or t.o make substituti.ons and the discreti.on .of the 
awarding auth.ority t.o consent t.o· substituti.ons to th.ose sit-
uati.ons listed in subdivisi.on (a) .of the statute, all .of which 
are keyed to the unwillingness .or inability .of the listed sub-
c.ontractor pr.operly to perf.orm. 
[6] Id.-Substitution· and Subletting.-Under G.ov. C.ode, § 410i, 
relating to substituti.on .of subc.ontractors by a prime c.ontrae. 
t.or .on a pubiic impr.ovement contract, unless a listed sub. 
contract.or becomes insolvent or fails .or refuses to perf.onn a 
written contract f.or the w.ork .or fails .or refuses to meet tbf 
b.ond requirements 'Of the prime contractor, the prime eon .. 
tractor may n.ot substitute an.other subc.ontract.or f.or the listed 
sub c.ontrac t.or, and the awarding auth.ority may n.ot c.onseJlt 
t.o such a substituti.on, until ·the c.ontract is presented t() 
\ the listed subc.ontract.or and he, after having had a reason· 
able .opportunity t.o d.o s.o, fails .or refuses t.o e~ecute tbt 
written c.ontract. 
[7] Id.-Substitution and Subletting.-G.ov. Code, § 4107, relating 
r t.o substituti.on .of subc.ontract.ors by a prime c.ontractor on • 
public impr.ovement c.ontract, c.onfers the right .on the listed sub. 
c.ontract.or t.o perf.orm the subc.ontract unless statut.ory grounds 
f.or a valid substituti.on exist, and the right may be enf.orced by 
anacti.on f.or damages against the prime -c.ontractor t.o reeover 
the benefit .of the bargain the listed subc.ontract.or w.ould have 
realized had he n.ot wr.ongfully been deprived .of the subcontracl 
[8] 
[9] 
Id.-Substitution and Subletting.-There is no 'statutory pr'O" 
visi9n f.or the rec.overy .of damages by a subc.ontractor agamst 
~ . public entity f.or its c.onsenting t.o a substitution .of nb-
ool;ltractors in vi.olati.on.of G.ov. Code, § 4107. . 
Id.-Substitution and Subletting.-A subcontractor who .-., 
listed in a prime contrac.or's bid .on a public improvemt"nl 
project in response to statutory command and n.ot because tbr 
contracting parties' purpose was expressly t.o benefit the sub-
c.ontractor, was at m.ost an incidental beneficiary and could D()! 
rec.over against the awarding auth.ority f.or breach .of eont~t 
as a third-party beneficiary .of the contract between the pnlDe 
c.ontractor and the awarding authority. 
[71 C.2d 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Clinton Rhodda, Court Commissioner, Judge 
pro tern. Affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions. 
Action by a subcontractor against a general contractor and 
a school district for damages for breaeh of contract, breach of 
8 statutory duty and for :negligence. Judgment of dismissal 
after demurrer to second amended complaint was sustained 
wit hout leave to amend· affirmed as to school district and 
ren~rsed with directions as to general contractor. 
~Iunns & I{ofiord, Munns, Kofford, Hoffman, Hunt & 
Throckmorton, Milton J. Morris, David M. Raatz, Jed L. 
Krlson and Gordon Hunt for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Raymond If. Levy as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
Grant & Popovich and Irvin Grant for Defendants and 
Respondents; 
TR.A YNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment ()f 
dismissal entered after a demurrer to its second amended 
, -
complaint was sustained without leave to amend. 
Plaintiff alleged that it is a licensed specWty subcontrac-
tor. On November 24, 1965, it submitted by telephone to 
defendant O. V. Holder, mc., a· general contractor, a subcon-
tract bid in the amount of $83,400 for the furnishing and 
installation of acoustical tile on a publie -construction job. 
Later that day Holder submitted a bid for the prime contract 
to codefendant Los Angeles. Unified School District. As re-
quired by law, .Holder listed the subcontractors who would 
perform work on the project of a value in excess of one-half of 
one percent of the total bid.1 Holder listed plaintiff as the 
lGO\-ernment Code sectio'n 4104' provides: '~Anyo:ffieer, department, 
hou!d or commission taking bids for the construction of any public work 
or Improvement shall provide in the specifications prepared for the :,;rk or improvement or in the general conditions under which bids will 
. r{'('eived for the doing of the work incident to the public work or 
l~lpro'\-ement that any person making a bid or offer to perform the work, 
• <ill. in his bid or offer, set forth: 
H (a) The name and the location of the place of business of each 
IU~I('ontractor who will perform work or labor or render service to the· 
"rune contractor in or about the construction of the work or improvement 
111 :lll amount in excess of one-half of 1 percent of the prime contractor's 
totul Ilid . 
.. (b) The portion of the work which will be done by each such sub-
:~n!ractor under this act. The. prime .contractor shall list. only one sub-
1• nh·ractor for each such portIon as IS defined by the prlme contractor 
11 IS bid. " 
) 
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acoustical tile subcontractor. Holder was ~ubsequently 
awarded the prime contract for construction of the facility 
and executed a written contract with the school district on 
Decenlber 9, 1965. A local trade newspaper widely circulated 
among subcontractors reported that Holder had been awarded 
the contractmld included in its report the names of the sub-
contractors listed in Holder's bid. Plaintiff read the report 
and, acting on the assumption that its bid had been accepted, 
refrained from bidding on other construction jObs in order to 
remain within its bonding limits. 
Sometime between December 27, 1965, and January 10, 
1966, Holder requested permission from the school district to 
substitute another subcontractor for plaintiff, apparently on 
the ground that plaintiff had been inadvertently listed in the 
bid in place of the intended subcontractor. The school district 
consented, and the substitution was made. Plaintiff then 
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the school district to 
rescind its consent to the change in subcontracto,rs. The trial 
court sustained the district's demurrer and thereafter dis-
'. . 
missed the proceeding. Plaintiff did not appeal. Plaintiff then 
. brought this action for damages against Holder and the school 
district. 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in sustaining 
the demurrer :on the' ground that the facts alleged in its com-
plaint would support recovery of damages for breach of eon-
tract, breach of a statutory duty, and for negligenc·e: We con-
clude that plaintiff has stated a caus~ of action for breach of a 
. statutory duty. - --~-. -
There was no contract between plaintiff and Holder, for 
Holder did not accept plaintiff's offer. [1]· Silen.ce in the 
face of an offer iSJ.lot an acceptance, unless there is a relation-
ship between the parties or a previous course of dealing pur-. 
suan t to which silence would be understood as acceptance. 
(See Wold v. League of the Cross (1931) 114 Cal.App. 414. 
479-481 [300 P. 57] ; lVood v. Gunther (1949,) 89 Cal.App.2d 
718, 730-731 [201 P.2d 874] ; 1 'Villiston on COntracts (3d ed. 
1957) §§ 91-91A; 1 V\Titkiu, Summary of Cal. Law (7th ed. 
1960) Contracts, § 60, pp. 65-67.) No such relationship or 
course of dealing is alleg£d. Nor did Holder accept the bid by 
using it in presenting its own bid. [2] In the absence of aD 
agreement to the contrary, listing of the subcontractor in ~f! 
prime bid is not an implied acceptance of the subcontracto!: 
bid by the general contractor. (Klose v. S,equoia Unio-n elg 
1 
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School Dist. (1953) 118 Ca.l.App.2d 636, 641 [258 P.2d 515] ; 
Sore ross v. Winters (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 207, 217 [25 Cal. 
Rptr. 821]. See Williams v. Favret (1947) 161 F.2d 822; 1 
Corbin on Contracts (1963) § 24 and fn. 11 at pp. 72-73. ) The 
listing by the general contractor of the subcontractors, he 
intends to retain is in response to statutory command (ffi>v. 
Code, § 4104) and cannot reasonably be construed as an ex-
pression of acceptance. (Cf. Western Concrete Structures Co. 
'". James I. Barnes Constr. Co. (1962) 206 Cal . .App.2d 1, 13 
[23 Cal.Rptr. 506]; Klose v. Sequoia Union High School 
Dist., supra, 118 Cal.App.2d 636,641.) , 
[3] Plaintiff contends, however, that its reliance on 
Holder's use of its bid and Holder's failure to, reject its offer 
promptly after Holder's bid was accepted constitute accept-
ance of plaintiff's bid by operation of law under the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel. Section 90 of the Restatement of Con-
tracts states: "A promise which the promisor should reason-
ably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and 
sUb;tantial character on the part Qf the promisee and which' 
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice 
can be avoided only by enforce&ment of the promise." This 
rule applies in this state. (Drennan v. Star Paving Co. (1958) 
51 Cal2d 409, 413 [333P.2d 757].) Before it can be invoked, 
howeyer, there must be a promise that was relied upon. (Bard 
. Y. Kent (1942) 19 Ca1.2d 449, 453 [122 P.2d 8, 139 A.L.R. 
1032] ; Hilltop Properties, Inc. v. State of California (1965) 
233 Cal.App.2d 349, 364 [43 Cal. Rptr. 605] ; lA Corbin on 
Contracts (1963) § 200, p. 218.) . 
In Drennan, we held that implicit in the subcontractor's 
bid was a subsidiary promise to keep his bid open for a rea-
8:mable time after award of the prime contract to give the 
general contractor an opportunity to accept the offer on which 
he relied in computing the prime' bid. The subsidiary promise 
Was implied "to preclude the ihJustice that would result if 
Ule offer could be revoked after the offeree had acted in detri-
Inental reliance thereon." (51 Ca1.2d at p. 414.) 
Plaintiff urges us to find an analogous subsidiary promise 
llot t.o reject its bid in this case, but it fails to allege facts 
ShOWing the existence of any promise by Holder to it· upon 
which it detrimentally relied .. Plaintiff did not rely on any 
promise by Holder, but only on the listing of subcontrac,tors 
required by section 4104 of the Government O>de and on the 
statutory restriction on Holder's right to change its list,ed 
subcontractors without the consent of the school district. 
724 SOUTHERN CAL. ACOUSTICS CO. V. [71 C.~ 
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(Gov. Code, § 4107.) Holder neither aecepted plaintiff's offe: 
. nor made any promise or offer to plaintiff intended to "indue 
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial charaetel 
" 
Plaintiff contends, however, tllat the Subletting and Sui 
contracting Fair Practices Act2 confers rights on listed sui 
contractors that arise when the prime c.ontract is awarded an~ 
that these rights may be enforced by an action for dam~ 
Before that act was adopted in 1963, it was settled that th 
Government Code sections governing subcontracting, whicl 
the act superseded, conferred no .rightson subcontracton; 
(Klose v.Sequoia Union H·igh School Dist., supra, 118 Cal 
App.~d 636, 641.) Klose was- a proceeding in mandate br.oughi 
by a taxpayer against the awarding authority to compel the 
latt~r to assess a penalty against a prime contractor. ThE 
prime contractor had changed subcontrac.tors with the consen1 
.of the awarding authority .on the gr.ound that the original 
listing had been the result .of error. The plaintiff contendoo 
that under the language of then Governmen,t Code section 
4104, subdivision (d)3 an awarding authority had no legal 
power to consent to the change on the ground stated and that 
the substitution was therefore in violation of the statuia Such 
a violation would render the prinle contractor liable for pen-
alties provided for by then section 4106. (Now § 4110.) 
The court denied relief on the ground that the language of 
subdivision (d) of section 4104 that auth.orizedthe substitu-. 
tion of another for. a subcontractor who failed to execute a 
........ 2Stats. 1963, ch. 2125, pp. 4410-4414,amending and renumberingaee--
tions 4100-4108 of the Government Code. These sections of the GOl'erll-
ment Code set out requirements for listing of subcontractors in the prUDe 
bid and for all<;>wable substitutions of listed subcontractors. 
3Prior to the 1963 act, section 4104 provided: '. 
I' N Q general contractor whose bid is accepted' shall, without the ~. 
sent of the a.warding authority, either:· . 
II (a) Substitute any personas subcontractor in place of the subeolt-
tractor designated in the original bid. . 
II (b) Permit any such subcontract to be assigned or transferred ., 
allow it to be performed by anyone other than the original subconuaeiOf 
listed in the bid. . 
,t (c) . Sublet or subcontract any portion .of the work in excess of. oat" 
half (IA!) of one per cent (1%) of the general contractor's total bId .. 
to which his original bid did not designate a subcontractor. . ... .r 
" (d) The awarding authority may consent to the subshtutl~1l ... 
allother person as a subcontractor, when the subcontractor !lamed l;.!-
bid after haying had a reasonable opportunity to do so, falls or re tk' 
to execute a written contract, when said written contract, based upo~ i»' 
general terms, conditions, plans and specifications for the proJe:ed ... 
volved, or t.he terms of such subcontractor's written bid, is prescn . 
him by the contractor." -
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written contract did not limit the awarding authority's dis-
cretion to consent to the substitution of subcontractors in 
otJwr situations. In so concluding the court listed a series of 
situations in which substitutions not provided for by subdivi-
sion (d) would be necessary to the efficient execution of a 
pub) ic project.4 The court also concluded that the purpose of 
tht' listing and substitution sections was not to grant rights to 
listed subcontractors, but to provide an opportunity to the 
awarding authority to investigate and a.pprove the initial sub-
contractors and any proposed substitutions. 
The amendments made by the 1963 Subletting and Subcon-
tTll('t.ing Fair Practices Act stated the purposes of the statute 
in a preamble (§ 4101) 5 and completely revised the section 
dE'aling with substitution of subContractors, renumbering it 
s('Ction 4107.6 [4] The purpose, of the amended statute is 
4R('ferring to the plaintiff's construction of section 4104 the court 
stated: "Such a construction, limiting the right. of the awarding au-
thority to authorize a substitution to the one situation where the original 
.. uhe.o~tractor refuses tp execute a written contract, would create a com-
pletely unworkable system. It would mean that once a general contract 
bad been accepted by the awarding authority, no substitution of a sub-
("ontractor could be made against his will, even though such subcontractor 
refused to complete the wor!t, or neglected or was unable to handle the 
job, went out of business or into bankruptcy, or even died." (118 Cal. 
App.2d at pp. 639-640.) 
61 'The Legislature' finds that the practices of bid shopping and bid 
peddling in connection. with the construction, alteration, and repair of 
llublic improvements often result in poor quality of material and work-
manship to the detriment of the public, deprive the public of the full 
hcnefits of fair competition among prime contractors and subcontractors, 
~ld lead to insolvencies, loss of wages to empl~yees, and other evils. " 
(Gov. Code, § 4101.) 
61' No prime contractor whose bid is accepted shall: 
"(a) Substitute any person as subcontractor in place of the sub-
('ontractor listed in the original bid, except that the awarding authority 
may consent to the substitution of another-per.,son as a subcontractor, 
"'hen the subcontractor listed in the bid after having had a reasonable 
opportunity to do so fails or refuses to execute a written contract, when 
Bueh written eo..~tra.et, based upon the general terms, conditions, plans 
and specifications for the project involved or the terms of such' sub-
('ontractor's written bid, is presented to-him by the prime contractor, or 
Lt'comes insolvent or fails or refuses to perform a written contract for 
the work or fails or refuses to meet the bond requirements of the prime 
('ontractor as set forth in Section 4108. Prior to approval of any such 
"uhstitution the awarding authority shall give notice in writing of at 
!t'ast three working days to the listed subcontractor of the prime con-
trador's request to substitute another subcontractor :unless such listed 
;Ui.t0utractor has himself advised the awarding authority in writing that 
It' has knowledge of the prime contractor's request. Such notiee may be 
t-"r\'ed by registered mail to the last known address of such subcontractor. 
f ., (b) Permit any such subcontract to -be "VoluntarilY'assigiled or trans-
''rted or allow it to be performed by anyone other than the original 
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not limited, as Klose had concluded with respect to the prior 
statute, to providing the awarding authority with an oppor-
tunity to approye substitute subcontractors. Its purpose is 
also to protect the public and subcontractors from the evils 
attendant upon the practices of bid shopping and bid ped-
dling subsequent to the award of the prime contract for a 
public facility.7 [5] Thus section 4107 now clearly limits 
the right of the prime contractor to make substitutions and 
the discretion of the awarding authority to consent t.o substi. 
tutions to those situations listed in subdivision (a), all of 
which are keyed to the unwillingness or inability of the listed 
subcontractor properly to perform. 8 [6] Unless a listed 
subcontractor" becomes insolvent or fails or refuses to per-
form a written contract for the work or fails or refuses to 
meet the bond requirements of the prime contractor," the 
prime contractor may not substitute another subcontractor for 
the listed subcontractor and the awarding authority may not 
consent to such a substitution until the contract is presented 
to the listed subcontractor and he, after having had a reason-
subcontractor listed in the original bid, without the consent of the award· 
ing authority. 
" (c) Other than in the performance of 'change orders' causing 
changes or deviations from the original contract, sublet or subcontrart-
any portion of the work in excess of one-half of 1 percent of the prime" 
contractor's total bids as to which his original bid did not designate a 
subcontractor." (Gov. Code, § 4107.) 
7Bid shopping is the use of the low bid already received by the gent-raJ 
contractor to pressure other subcontractors into sUbmitting even ]01\'1"r 
bids. Bid peddling, conversely, is an attempt by a subcontractor to undt"f· 
-cut known bids already submitted to the general eontractorin ordcTlo 
procure the job. (See Schueller, Bid Depositories (1960) 58 l\:t:ich.L.Rt'1'. 
497,498, fn. 6; Note (1967) 53 Va.L.Rev. 1720, 1724.) The statute it 
designed to prevent only bid shopping and peddling that takes place aftt'r 
the award of the prime contract. The underlying reasons are clear. Su~ 
quent to the award of the prime contract at a set price, the prime ~Jl' 
tractor may seek to drive down his own cost, and concomitantly inerea~ 
his profit, by soliciting bids lo,,,,cr than those used in computing b" 
prime bid. When successful this practice places a profit squeeze ~n sub· 
contractors, impairing their incentive and ability to perform to theIr l.-st. 
and possibly precipitating bankruptcy in a weak subcontracting fi!,,",' 
<See Gov. Code, § 4101; Note, supra, 53 Va.L.Rev. 1720, 1724; Rt.n' 
Constr. Corp. (194i) 8 T.C. 1070, 1076.) Bid peddling and shopping pn~r 
to the award of the prime contract foster the same evils, but at least hJ.'r 
the effect of passing the reduced costs on to the public in the forPl (k 
lower prime contract bids. 
8It is significant that the amended statute allows for substitutiol1 (If 
subcontractors in all those situations listed hy the c,ourt in Elos(' ~t 
necessary to efficient construction of pub1ic faciUties. (See fns. 4 and t " 
supra.) Accor~ingb;, there is no basis for construing the 1?r~~ent s(tn;u .~i 
as the court 111 Klose felt compelled to construe subdlYlSlOll n t~ 
. t" on li(' former section 4104, to confer "plenary power of subshtu 1011 
nwarding authority." (118 Cal.App.2d at p. 639.) 
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able opportunity to do so, fails or refuses to execute the writ-
ten eontract. Accordingly, under the facts as pleaded in this 
ease. Holder had no right to substitute another subcontractor 
in place of plaintiff, and the school district had no right to 
('onsent to that substitution. 
[7] Since the purpose of the statute is to proteet both the 
public and subcontractors from the evils of the proscribed 
unfair bid peddling and bid shopping (GDv. Code, §§ 4100, 
4101), we hold that it confers the right on the listed suooon-
trdCior to perform the subcontract unless statuto!'Y grounds 
for a valid substitution exi~t. Moreover, that right may be 
enforced by an action for damages against the prime contrac-
tor t.o recover the benefit of the bargain the listed subcontrac-
tor would have realized had he not wrongfully been deprived 
of the subcontract. (SeeB.ermite Powder Co. v. Franchise Tax 
Board (1952) 38 Ca1.2d 700, 703 [242, P.2d 9] ; PaxtOn v. 
Paxton (1907) 150 Cal. 667, 670 [89 P. 1083]; Civ. Code, 
§ 3523.) Accordingly, plaintiff has stated a cause of action 
against defendant Holder for br~ach of section 4107.9 
[8] The question remains whether plaintiff' has stated a 
cause of action against the school district. Since there is no 
statutory provision for the recovery of damages against a, pub-
lic entity for its consenting to a substitution of subContract.ors 
in yiolation of section 4107, the school district is not liable for 
such violation. (Gov. Code, § 815.) [9] Plaintiff contends, 
however, that it was a third-party beneficiary of the contract 
between Holder and the school district and that therefQre it 
mny reeover against the school district for breach of contract. 
(See Gov. Code, § 814.) There is no merit in this contention. 
Plaintiff was listed in response to statutory command and not 
because the contracting parties' purpose was expressly to 
IIIn addition to seeking recovery of its anticipated profits of $15,000, 
p!aintiff in a separate Cause of action, seeks to recover his expenses of 
t~1I0 "in preparation and planning to perform the contract" on the 
theory that its incurring of those expenses was caused by Holder's negli-
geUt'e in listing plaintiff as a subcontractor. We find no basis under the 
f:l(·ts pleaded for a separate cause of action for negligence. After plain-
tiff learned, however, that it had been listed as a subcontractor in a prime 
('ontract av..arded to Holder, it was entitled to assume that it would be 
?ff('red the subcontract as required by section 4107 until Holder notified 
It o.f the intended substitution. Expenses reasonably incurred during this 
11(·tlOd may be recovered in addition to plaintiff's anticipated profits in 
~r?t't to give it the benefit of the bargain to which it was entitled. 
,Gollaher v. Midwood Constr. Co. (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 640, 649 [15 
t( ~l.Hptr. 292] ; Rest., Contracts, § 346, com. g; 11 Williston on Contracts 
3d ed. 1968) § 1363.) 
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benefit it. Accordingly, plaintiff was at most an incidental 
beneficiary and therefore cannot recover as a third-party bene-
ficiary of the contraCt between Holder and the school district. 
(Civ.· Code, § 1559; West v. Guy F. Atkinson Constr. Co. 
(1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 296, 302 [59 Cal. Rptr. 286] ; Southern 
Cal. Gas Co. v. ABC Constr. Co. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 747, 
751-752 [22 Cal.Rptr. 540].) 
The judgment of dismissal as to defendant school district is 
. affirmed. The judgment of dismissal as to defendant Holder is 
reversed with directions to the trial court to overrule the 
demurrer as to defendant Holder and allow it to answer. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. . 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was,~enied September 
4,1969. 
[L. A. No. 29621. In Bank. Aug. 5, 1969.] 
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